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Settlor-Authorized Fiduciary Indifference to Trust
Purposes and the Interests of Beneficiaries
James P. Spica*
I. INTRODUCTION
The confluence of Uniform Trust Code (UTC) sections 105(b), 801,
and 1008(a)(1) (Triplex) is that the terms of a trust cannot relieve a trustee of either (1) “the duty . . . to act in good faith and in accordance with
the terms and purposes of the trust and the interests of the beneficiaries1 or (2) “liability for breach of trust committed in bad faith or
with reckless indifference to the purposes of the trust or the interests of
the beneficiaries.”2 Is a settlor thereby precluded from providing, for the
beneficiaries’ sake, that in certain circumstances, a trustee may ignore
purposes of the trust and interests of the beneficiaries?
II. MOTIVATION
A settlor, S, wants a professional trust-service provider, T, to act as
trustee of an irrevocable trust and to reduce her standard fee in light of
the allocation of a discrete administrative function to H, a nonbeneficiary holder of a power to direct the trustee. S reasons that H will accept
full fiduciary responsibility for the directed function3 and that T should
therefore reduce her fee for the directed function to zero.4 Assuming
she can make the relevant price differentiation, T will evaluate whether
* Attorney, Chalgian & Tripp Law Offices, Southfield, Michigan. The author, an
ACTEC Fellow, is a Uniform Law Commissioner and a sometime American Bar Association Advisor to the ULC. He is the principal author of several Michigan statutes, including the Personal Property Trust Perpetuities Act (2008 Mich. Pub. Act 148). He clerked
for Hon. Richard C. Wilbur on the United States Tax Court (1985) and taught jurisprudence, taxation, and trusts and estates as an Assistant/Associate Professor of Law at the
University of Detroit Mercy (1989–2000, tenured 1996).
1 UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 105(b)(2), 801 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010); see also id.
§ 103(8) (defining “interests of the beneficiaries”).
2 Id. § 1008(a)(1); see id. § 105(b)(10).
3 I.e., S intends H to act in a fiduciary capacity, subject to the same duties and
liabilities that a trustee would have in performing the directed function without direction.
For the common law’s countenance of fiduciary administrative powers granted nominatim to nontrustees, see, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 75 cmt. b. (AM. LAW
INST. 2007) and J. E. PENNER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS ¶ 3.20 (8th ed. 2012).
4 Market incentives for price differentiation are discussed as a policy rationale for
features of the UDTA in James P. Spica, From Strength to Strength: A Comment on Morley and Sitkoff’s Making Directed Trusts Work, 44 ACTEC L.J. 215, 215–18 (2019).
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to cut her fee by asking in what circumstances she can be liable for doing just what S would have her do—follow directions. To the extent T
can be liable to beneficiaries for doing exactly as directed by H when H
is acting within her authority under the trust, or for doing nothing when
directions are not forthcoming, the request that T reduce her professional fee is a request that she forgo compensation for risk or, equivalently, for effort that she will have to mount—in the way of vigilance
over H—to avoid risk.5
Anticipating T’s calculation, S adopts trust terms (Protections) expressly negating T’s duty to (1) second guess H for any reason when H is
acting within her authority under the trust, (2) monitor H or report on
H’s activities, (3) prompt H when H is quiescent, (4) take over for H in
any circumstance, etc. Can T safely rely on these Protections?
III. INTERPRETATION
The Uniform Directed Trust Act (UDTA) would sanction the Protections to some extent.6 But in a UTC state that has not enacted the
UDTA, it has to be reckoned that the Protections purportedly license
T’s indifference to affected trust purposes and interests of the beneficiaries:7 to advance the beneficiaries’ economic interests in administrative efficiency, S has presumed to make T fiduciary-care-free in respect
of exercises and nonexercises of H’s power. And T’s reliance on the
Protections may itself constitute “reckless indifference” within the
meaning of section 1008(a)(1);8 for “a trustee who relied on the presence of a trustee exemption [i.e., exculpatory] clause to justify what he
proposed to do would thereby lose its protection: he would be acting
recklessly in the proper sense of the term.”9
That is a problem if section 801 imposes a “positive” duty10 to pursue trust purposes or interests of beneficiaries that is independent of,
and, therefore, may conflict with, the duty to administer the trust “in
accordance with its terms.”11 In that case, T may be liable to a claim that
(1) although an improvident direction of H’s was not contrary to the
5

Id. at 216.
See id. passim; Jane Ditelberg, Am I My Brother’s Keeper: Willful Misconduct and
the Directed Trustee under the Uniform Directed Trust Act, 44 ACTEC L.J. 215 (2019).
7 Cf. supra Part I.
8 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 1008(a)(1) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).
9 Armitage v. Nurse, [1998] Ch. 241 at 253–54 (Eng.).
10 R. P. Austin, Moulding the Content of Fiduciary Duties, in TRENDS IN CONTEMPORARY TRUST LAW 153, 159 (A. J. Oakley ed., 1996) (“[T]he positive side of fiduciary
duties [is] usually expressed as the duty to act in good faith . . . .”).
11 See UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 105(b)(2), 801.
6
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terms of the trust, T knew12 that it constituted a breach of a duty of H’s,
so that despite the Protections, compliance was a breach of T’s duty to
pursue relevant purposes of the trust and interests of the beneficiaries;
(2) given that in complying, T relied on the Protections, T’s breach was
committed with reckless indifference;13 and, therefore, (3) T cannot be
relieved of liability for her compliance with H’s direction.14 On this interpretation (Interpretation 1), the Protections are unenforceable as a
violation of section 105(b).15
IV. AMPHIBOLY
The Comment to section 801 is ambiguous: it says the section “confirms that a primary duty of a trustee is to follow the terms and purposes
of the trust,”16 but having articulated “primary duty” with the indefinite
article, the Comment does not indicate whether section 801 also confirms any other “primary duty” of the trustee. And the Comment suggests that “the purposes and particular terms of the trust can on
occasion conflict”17 without indicating whether such conflict is liable to
be normative, in the sense of being a conflict between independent duties, rather than merely interpretive.18 It is possible that the conjunction
“terms and purposes of the trust” is merely a hendiadys meaning the
terms of the trust properly interpreted in light of the trust’s purposes,
which would allow interpretive but not normative conflict between purposes and terms. But the Comment does not require such a reading.
V. COUNTER-INDICATIONS
A 2005 amendment to the Comment to section 105 suggests (1) that
the expressions “purposes of the trust” and “terms and purposes of the
trust and the interests of the beneficiaries” are synonymous and (2) that
settlors can determine the interests of beneficiaries by means of express
terms.19 And there was an even clearer contradiction of Interpretation 1
in the Comment to former section 808;20 for although that section pro12 “[A] person has knowledge of a fact if . . . [f]rom all the facts and circumstances
known to the person at the time in question, the person has reason to know it.” Id.
§ 104(a).
13 Armitage, Ch. 241 at 254.
14 See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 1008(a)(1) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).
15 See id. § 105(b)(2).
16 Id. § 801 cmt. (amended 2018).
17 Id.
18 See id.
19 See id. § 105 cmt. (amended 2004, 2005 & 2018) (referring to section 103(8)’s
definition of “interests of the beneficiaries”).
20 See id. § 808 cmt. (indicating former UTC section 808 subsections (b)–(d) were
deleted in 2018 in light of the UDTA).
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vided that a nonbeneficiary holder of a power to direct is “presumptively a fiduciary”21 and that a trustee must comply with an exercise of
such a power “unless . . . the trustee knows the attempted exercise
would constitute a serious breach of a fiduciary duty that the [power
holder] owes to the beneficiaries,”22 the Comment said, “[t]he provisions of this section [808] may be altered in the terms of the trust. See
Section 105. A settlor can provide that the trustee must accept the decision
of the power holder without question.”23 If that is true, the terms of S’s
trust can relieve T of any duty to second guess H in the exercise or
nonexercise of H’s power to direct (at least when H is acting within her
authority under the trust).24 Unfortunately, the Comment did not explain how this latitude is reconciled with the Triplex.
VI. SELF-FRUSTRATION
A “Legislative Note” to the UDTA advising modification of UTC
section 105(b)(2)25 indicates that the Uniform Law Commission has
lately concluded that such a reconciliation is at least doubtful.26 We can
grant that much based on Parts III and IV above. But to that extent,
Interpretation 1 involves us in the paradox that trust beneficiaries
should suffer for being equity’s “darling[s],”27 “the spoilt child[ren] of
English jurisprudence”;28 for on Interpretation 1, our regard for beneficiaries’ “beneficial interests”29 is so great that we cannot allow S to confer the benefit (as she conceives it) of a division of administrative labor
among professionals without multiplying fiduciary responsibility and,
thereby, the cost of administration.30
That seems perverse given that if S has her way, the trust beneficiaries will be owed exactly the quantum of fiduciary duty they would be
owed if T were not subject to direction.31 Why should we read the Triplex in such a way as to tax the beneficiaries’ interests (by the amount of
21

Id. § 808(d) (deleted in 2018).
Id. § 808(b) (deleted in 2018).
23 Id. § 808 cmt. (emphasis added).
24 See James P. Spica, Used Not Only as Directed: Michigan’s Adaptation of the Uniform Directed Trust Act, 64 WAYNE L. REV. 339, 371–72 (2019).
25 UNIF. DIRECTED TRUST ACT § 9 legislative note (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
26 For a more detailed discussion of grounds for that conclusion, see Spica, supra
note 24, at 372–77.
27 FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, Trust and Corporation, in MAITLAND SELECTED
ESSAYS 141, 173 (H. D. Hazeltine et al. eds., 1936).
28 Id.
29 See UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 103(8), 105(b)(2) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).
30 See supra Parts II–III.
31 See supra note 3.
22
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T’s standard fee for the directed function)32 just because S wants to secure for her beneficiaries the benefit (as she conceives it) of professional
administration and thinks that the best person to perform the directed
function is not also the best person to perform the residuum of trustee
functions?
VII. CORRECTION
We have the alternative of denying that section 801 imposes any
duty to pursue trust purposes or interests of beneficiaries that can conflict with the duty to administer the trust in accordance with its terms;
for the section can be understood according to traditional concepts as
imposing (1) “a duty to administer the trust, diligently and in good faith,
in accordance with the terms of the trust”33 and (2) a duty to administer
the trust, if it has beneficiaries,34 “solely in the interest of the beneficiaries.”35 The trust’s purposes are mentioned,36 on this view, apropos of
the first duty and only because trust terms have to be interpreted to be
followed37 while interpretation necessarily involves the ascription of coherent purposes to the settlor.38 And the second duty, the traditional
“duty of loyalty,”39 is, like its extension, the “duty of impartiality,”40
traditionally subject to the terms of the trust—it is not disloyal to remainder beneficiaries, for example, for a trustee to favor an income ben32

See supra text accompanying notes 3–5.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 76(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2007).
34 I.e., if the trust is neither a charitable trust nor a noncharitable “purpose trust,”
the latter being an express, noncharitable trust lacking definite or definitely ascertainable
beneficiaries. See, e.g., UNIF. TRUST CODE § 409(1); PENNER, supra note 3, ¶¶ 9.1–9.30;
Paul Matthews, The New Trust: Obligations without Rights?, in TRENDS IN CONTEMPORARY TRUST LAW 1, passim (A.J. Oakley ed., 1996).
35 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78(1).
36 See supra Part I.
37 Compare Hobbes’ dictum that “all laws, written and unwritten, have need of interpretation.” THEODORE F. T. PLUCKNETT, STATUTES AND THEIR INTERPRETATION IN
THE FIRST HALF OF THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY vi (Harold Dexter Hazeltine ed., 1922)
(quoting Thomas Hobbes).
38 See, e.g., DONALD DAVIDSON, Hume’s Cognitive Theory of Pride, in ESSAYS ON
ACTIONS AND EVENTS 277, 290 (1980) (regarding interpretation of “human thoughts,
speech, intentions, motives, and actions”); GREGORY VLASTOS, SOCRATES, IRONIST AND
MORAL PHILOSOPHER 236 (1991) (regarding interpretation of texts). For what seems to
be a flatfooted misunderstanding of this fundamental point in the context of statutory
interpretation, see Gerald C. MacCallum, Jr., Legislative Intent, in ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 237, 240–45 (Robert S. Summers ed., 1970); compare RUPERT CROSS, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 32–33, 57 (John Bell & George Engle eds., 3d ed. 2005) (getting
the point right).
39 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2007).
40 Id. § 79 cmt. b. (“The duty of impartiality is an extension of the duty of loyalty to
beneficiaries . . . .”).
33
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eficiary when the terms of the trust direct the trustee to favor the
income beneficiary.41
On this alternative interpretation (Interpretation 2), if the Protections, interpreted in light of the trust’s purposes, allow T to comply with
H’s exercises and nonexercises of her (H’s) power without question,
then, provided the Protections are “for the benefit of [the trust’s] beneficiaries,”42 T cannot commit a breach of trust—she cannot violate any
duty she owes as trustee to any beneficiary of the trust43—by adhering
to the Protections.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Thus, Interpretation 2 avoids the policy paradox we have noted,44
makes sense of the counter-indications in the UTC to Interpretation 1,45
and allows a trust professional like T, in a UTC state that has not enacted the UDTA, to credit a division of administrative labor like S’s as a
scheme of fiduciary-risk allocation.

41 “Except as limited by law or public policy (see § 29), the extent of the interest of
a trust beneficiary depends upon the intention manifested by the settlor.” Id. § 49; see id.
§ 50 cmt. f (noting role of beneficiary’s “favored status”); id. § 78(1) (subordinating trustee’s “duty to administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiaries” to what is
“otherwise provided in the terms of the trust”); id. § 79 cmt. b (subordinating duty of
impartiality to preferences and priorities discernible from terms of beneficial interests).
See also UNIF. FIDUCIARY INCOME AND PRINCIPAL ACT § 201(a)(2) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N
2018) (describing fiduciary’s duty to “administer a trust or estate impartially, except to
the extent the terms of the trust manifest an intent that the fiduciary shall or may favor
one or more beneficiaries”).
42 As is required by UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(b)(3) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).
43 See id. § 1001(a) (defining “breach of trust”).
44 See supra Part VI.
45 See supra Part V.

